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Abstract
The growing corpus of studies about political elites in Spain has tended to focus on national 
and regional parliaments and executives, rather than on the municipal level of government. 
And yet, it is in these local settings that politicians acquire skills and political experience, 
develop their notions of democracy, and often start their political careers. Exploring pat-
terns of political recruitment in Spanish local democracies allows us to look at some of the 
literature findings on this topic and check whether they also apply at the municipal level in 
Spain, enhancing in this way our understanding of who governs our cities, too. This article 
analyzes Spanish mayors’ social profiles, their patterns of professionalization and their 
political ambitions, trying to address questions such as: do municipal leaders share a com-
mon background? Are they amateurs or professionals in politics? Is the municipal level the 
first stage of an identifiable political career of Spanish representatives? In responding to 
these questions, this paper draws on survey data from a representative sample of 303 mayors 
in municipalities with populations larger than 10 000 inhabitants. The analysis confirms 
that Spanish mayors follow to a great extent the patterns found in studies of political elites 
and particularly those of local executives in other countries in Europe, but with some dis-
tinctive singularities.
Keywords: local government, local democracy, mayors, political recruitment, political leaders, 
Spain.
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Resumen
La literatura sobre élites políticas en España ha tendido a centrarse en el estudio de los parla-
mentos y de los gobiernos nacionales y autonómicos, en lugar del nivel de gobierno municipal. 
Pese a ello, es precisamente en el entorno local donde los políticos adquieren sus habilidades y 
experiencia política, donde desarrollan sus nociones de democracia y donde en muchas ocasio-
nes inician sus carreras políticas. El estudio de los patrones de reclutamiento en las democracias 
locales españolas nos permite comprobar si algunos de los hallazgos que ofrecen las investiga-
ciones en la materia se confirman a nivel municipal en España, mejorando así nuestro conoci-
miento acerca de quiénes gobiernan nuestras ciudades. Este artículo analiza los perfiles sociales 
de los alcaldes y alcaldesas españoles, sus patrones de profesionalización y sus ambiciones polí-
ticas, intentando abordar cuestiones como: ¿Comparten los líderes locales antecedentes comu-
nes? ¿Son amateurs o políticos profesionales? ¿Es el nivel municipal un primer paso en una 
carrera política identificable de los representantes españoles? Para responder a estas preguntas 
el trabajo se apoya en información procedente de una encuesta a una muestra representativa de 
303 alcaldes de municipios de más de 10 000 habitantes. Los resultados confirman que los 
alcaldes y alcaldesas españoles comparten los patrones identificados por la literatura sobre élites 
políticas, particularmente la referida a gobiernos locales en otros países europeos, si bien se 
identifican algunas especificidades propias. 
Palabras clave: gobierno local, democracia local, alcaldes, reclutamiento político, líderes políti-
cos, España.
INTRODUCTION
Cities are the public spaces where we first learn about the functioning of democ-
racy and where we develop as citizens. Following the profound decentralization pro-
cesses that took place throughout Europe (Vetter and Kersting, 2003) including Spain 
(Navarro and Velasco, 2016) at the end of the last century, city governments have 
become increasingly relevant in the multilevel governance system and in providing 
services for the welfare of their residents. This makes them key actors in our political 
systems and, therefore, an attractive field for investigation. Cities are governed by 
mayors, visible heads of local democracies.
Important though mayors are, the literature on political elites has only partially 
analyzed this group of representatives (Sundstrom, 2013). In the case of Spain, the 
growing body of studies of political recruitment has tended to focus on national and 
regional parliaments or executives (Coller et al., 2016; Rodríguez Teruel, 2011) rather 
than on the municipal level of government. These more than eight thousand mayoral 
offices periodically filled with local representatives have thus remained under-re-
searched. However, recruitment patterns and career development in a specific political 
system can only fully be understood if the local world is also analyzed.
In this study, the recruitment process refers to the path that leads to the head of 
the local government, the mayoral office. In municipal electoral contests, lists are 
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closed and blocked and mainly made by parties (or electoral coalitions). After elec-
tions, Spanish mayors (alcaldes) are indirectly elected by the councilors in the first 
council session. More specifically, only councilors that were at the top of the electoral 
lists could be candidates for the mayoral office. To become a mayor, it is required 
either the absolute majority of councilors’ votes or, if this majority is not reached in 
the first vote, the councilor heading the list with most citizens’ votes automatically 
becomes the mayor. Once in office, Spanish mayors are the central figures of their 
municipal government. In typologies of local government forms, they belong to the 
“Strong Mayor” category, for they are able to “control the majority of the city council 
and are legally and actually in full charge of all the executive functions” (Mouritzen 
and Svara, 2002: 55). 
Exploring who our local elites are matters for a better understanding of paths in 
the political career and the functioning conditions of this cradle of the Spanish polit-
ical elite; it also allows us to examine the extent to which political positions are open 
to everyone irrespective of their social background, or whether a link between descrip-
tive representation (characteristics of those in an elected office) and substantive rep-
resentation (the type of political action, leadership style and policies they adopt) can 
be established (Pitkin, 1967). This article will tackle this topic by looking at the extent 
to which the main literature’s findings on the selection and career of political elites can 
also be found in the Spanish local context. They mainly refer to: a) the overrepresenta-
tion of a specific profile among representatives —i.e. male, middle-age, middle class— 
and b) the professionalization of the local political elite. Although this topic has 
obvious normative implications, this contribution does not aim to address them, but 
rather to contribute to the growing knowledge base about the Spanish local elite to 
make normative studies possible.
Thus, it seeks a response to the following questions: who stands for and gets elected 
mayor? Do municipal leaders share a common background? Are they amateurs or pro-
fessionals in politics? Does the municipal political level of representation in Spain pro-
vide a career path to office in regional or central institutions? Our approach is both 
descriptive and analytical: Descriptive because it offers information on the main 
socio-economic traits and on the perceptions about ambitions of current Spanish 
mayors in large and medium sized municipalities. And analytical in attempting to find 
different patterns of career development, taking as potential explanatory factors varia-
bles such as age, education, sex, party affiliation, party family or size of the municipality. 
Our hypotheses are derived from works based on the study of both national and 
regional legislatures (i.e. Cotta and Best, 2000; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; Coller 
et al., 2016) and local assemblies and executives (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006; Kjaer, 
2006; Guerin and Kerrouche, 2008). To test them, we use data from the so-called 
POLLEADER II Project (Political Leaders in European Cities. Second Round)1. This 
1. A similar survey —POLLEADER I— was conducted between 2003 and 2004 across seventeen 
countries, whose main results are detailed in Back et al. (2006).
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is a comparative data set based on a survey conducted across 29 European countries 
between 2015 and 2016 which aims to analyze the role played by mayors and the 
transformation of political representation at the local level2. In this survey, an identical 
questionnaire was sent to all mayors in municipalities with populations above 10 000 
inhabitants which included questions on social background and political ambitions. 
The Spanish dataset consists of 303 respondents, 40 % of the total (for a detailed over-
view of the POLLEADER research project, see the introductory article of this special 
issue and Heinelt et al., 2018). Although it is not strictly a sample, we believe that the 
number of mayors interviewed and the territorial and gender representation in the 
whole dataset ensure suitable conditions for reliable statistical analysis. The major 
caveat comes from the selection of municipalities, limited to those of medium and big 
size. Therefore, the findings of this contribution apply to the elites of these local gov-
ernments, which, in any case, cover 80 % of the Spanish population. 
This work is structured in four sections. After this brief introduction, the litera-
ture’s main arguments and findings on the social background of political recruitment 
and professionalization of local executives are presented in the next section. The 
third and fourth sections describe the data and methods used in this article, presents 
the analysis of the database and discusses its findings in the light of the previous stud-
ies in the topic. The paper concludes by pointing to some general conclusions and to 
elements suggested by the study as avenues for further research.
PATTERNS OF POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND CAREER 
DEVELOPMENT
The process by which individuals are selected for inclusion among political elites 
is called political recruitment. The question arises: do all potential candidates for 
inclusion have the same chances of being selected for the electoral list or position? The 
literature on political elites reports that recruitment operates in such a way that having 
a specific social profile increases the chances for individuals to enter and remain in 
political office (see, for example, Eulau and Prewitt, 1973; Norris and Lovenduski, 
1995; Cotta and Best, 2000).
The “supply and demand model” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995) is a well-known 
approach for explaining political recruitment. It presents the outcome of selection as 
the interaction between the supply of candidates wishing to stand for political office 
and the demands of gatekeepers or selectorates (parties) who select the candidates. 
Supply factors are inherent in the aspirants’ individual characteristics : they are the 
traits that increase their chances to run for, and remain in, office. Among the elements 
that can shape the supply of candidates are their personal resources (education, time, 
2. This research has been financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness: 
«Una nueva arquitectura local: eficiencia, dimensión y democracia» (CSO213-48641-C2-1-R).
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 46. Marzo 2018, pp. 21-48
The social base and career development of Spanish mayors 25
experience), motivation, ambition or interest in politics (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer, 
2013). Not all individuals aspiring to political office have the same opportunities. For 
instance, the personal resource “time to devote to politics” might be scarcer for 
younger people or for women compared to men or middle-age candidates due to their 
personal circumstances. Demand factors refer to the parties selectorates’ preferences. 
They point to parties and how they engage in the candidates recruiting process with 
specific perceptions of their qualifications and skills. These perceptions can be influ-
enced by, among other things, shortcuts that lead to identifying only individuals from 
one’s own social networks or with some particular profile.
In looking at the actual result of these interactions between supply and demand, 
most studies coincide in pointing at gender, age, educational achievement and occu-
pation as important factors for attaining places on the electoral lists. It is what some 
authors refer to as the “3 M mantra” of elite research (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006): 
representatives tend to be male, middle-aged and middle-class. At every level of gov-
ernment or the type of legislature, there is an over-representation of these population 
groups among the political elite. The afore-mentioned factors will now be taken in turn.
Gender
The under-representation of women within the political class is one of the best 
reported and most researched aspects of political life (Kittilson, 2013). However, the 
past two decades have witnessed enormous transformations in the presence of this 
group in the political sphere. Changes in society, as well as parties’ internal rules and 
national gender quotas have proved to be effective tools for increasing women’s rep-
resentation in elected bodies of government (Franceschet et al., 2013). 
Spain constitutes a positive example of the gradual inclusion of women in the 
political sphere. Over the past two decades, their proportion in legislatures has 
increased from less than 20 % across the board in the mid-90s to current figures of 
40 % in the national lower chamber, 45 % in regional parliaments and 36 % in local 
assemblies (see figure 1). It is remarkable how rapid and homogeneous the inclusion 
of women —particularly in regional parliaments— has been (Verge et al., 2016). By 
contrast and interestingly, rates are lower at the local level. This is a common pattern 
not only in Spain but throughout Europe in general (Sundstrom, 2013), despite the 
intuitive perception that women should have greater access to local elected office 
where supply barriers such as time devoted to political activity or geographical dis-
tance are lower. However, few studies have addressed the topic of women in local pol-
itics (Navarro and Medir, 2015). 
Studies report that once the threshold of the “critical mass” of a 30 % of women 
in legislatures has been achieved, it rarely recedes (Santana et al., 2015). However, the 
same progress has not been made in power positions and, consequently, more atten-
tion is focused now on the thicker “glass ceiling” women face in gaining access to exec-
utive positions (Paxton and Hughes, 2013; Santana et al., 2015): their chances to rise 
26 Carmen Navarro y Alberto Sanz
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 46. Marzo 2018, pp. 21-48
to the top of the political power hierarchy decrease when compared to legislatures. 
Mayoral offices are not an exception. Previous studies (Sundstrom, 2013; Navarro 
and Medir, 2016) have found that women are underrepresented among mayors, espe-
cially in systems such as Spain’s, where the “strong mayor” type of local government 
makes the mayoral office the center of political power (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006). 
In sum, it is more difficult for women to gain access to local assemblies, and it is par-
ticularly difficult for them to become part of the core power apparatus that make key 
decisions. 
Researchers have identified three categories of factors that explain varying levels 
of women’s participation in political office: institutional (Duverger, 1955; Kittil-
son, 2006; Wangnerud, 2009; Oñate, 2014) such as electoral rules, how parties 
organize candidate selection or gender quotas; socioeconomic (Rosembluth et al., 
2006; Iversen and Rosembluth, 2008) such as the proportion of women in the 
workforce and the strength of the welfare state; and cultural (Dalherup and Ley-
ennard, 2013) such as modernization trends, beliefs about equality, and the social 
acceptance of women for representational and leadership roles. The have also found 
that, other things being equal, leftist parties have traditionally been more likely to 
nominate women to safe places on their lists, although party ideology seems not to 
matter as much nowadays as it did in the past (Kittilson, 2013). In addition, in big 
cities the percentage of women in the mayoral office tends to increase (Steyvers and 
Reynaert, 2006).
Figure 1.
Share of women in assemblies (Spain)
Source: Instituto de la Mujer.
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All this leads us to expect that, for our sample, women would be unequally repre-
sented in mayoral offices, with lower shares than those found in legislatures, consider-
ing that it is the top position in the ladder to power in local government. We also 
expect to find differences by municipality size and party family, with more highly 
populated cities (because they are more diverse in representation) and leftist parties 
identified as factors related to higher female presence in mayoral offices.
Age
The age distribution of political elites is a key aspect of their social background and 
can have normative implications, as well. The openness of the political arena and the 
system’s capacity to benefit from groups of all ages, and from newcomers, can be 
assessed through this variable. 
Local political systems tend to score low in the inclusion of young people among 
their political elites (Reynaert, 2012). From a normative perspective, this trend has 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, institutions and the decision-making 
process can benefit from new and different ideas if young elites occupy office; on the 
other hand, their inexperience in office can lead them to be less pragmatic and more 
inclined to avoid pacts in order to overcome policy paralysis (Coller et al., 2008).
The overrepresentation of middle-aged people in political positions might be 
explained by the so-called “life cycle” hypothesis (Steyvers, 2006), according to which 
candidates belonging to this group are in a better position to attain political access than 
their younger counterparts. Middle-aged aspirants enter electoral competitions having 
a) some already acquired professional and/or political experience that makes them 
more competitive for representative positions; b) more time to dedicate to politics after 
having passed through the central and most time-consuming period of life (e.g. raising 
their children, professional training); and c) already constructed consistent social, pro-
fessional and party networks, which situate them in the best position to access power. 
In other words, the costs of getting involved in political activity are reduced in this 
period of life.An additional trait completes the understanding of this logic. The higher 
the level of power of the representative or executive position —or, in other words, the 
more exclusive the office— the longer it takes to get there. Therefore, one might expect 
that national parliamentarians would be older than their regional colleagues, and that 
ministers would be older than legislative representatives, etc.
In local government and specifically for the position of mayor, previous studies 
(for municipalities with populations above 10 000) have identified that middle-aged 
office holders are overrepresented (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006; Verhelst et al., 2013). 
But, interestingly, the analysis also revealed that Spanish mayors were the youngest in 
the European group, 47.7 years old on average, compared to 56.4 in France, 52.4 in 
Germany and 57.1 in England (Ibid). Almost 40 % of Spanish mayors were between 
the ages of 40 and 49 (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006). The youth of Spanish represent-
atives is not a feature limited to mayoral positions. Regional parliaments are also 
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political arenas where high rates of relatively young politicians can be found. They are 
48.2 years old on average (42 % of them are older than 50, 45 % are between 50 
and 36 years old, and 13 % of them are under 36) (Bermúdez and Serrano, 2016). 
And this distinctive pattern of the Spanish political elite extends to the highest office 
of the executive as well. Most prime ministers in the last four decades were in their late 
forties when they first took office. Other studies have shown that female parliamentar-
ians are younger than men, which seems to be connected to lower rates of seniority in 
political party’s affiliation (Verge et al., 2016). 
Taking all this into account, we expect that mayors in our sample would tend to 
be middle- aged, although there will be variation by gender and by size of municipality.
Education and profession 
The literature on political elites describes a pattern of political leaders having high 
levels of education and belonging to specific highly qualified professions (Cotta and Best, 
2000; Bermúdez and Serrano, 2016). University training is nowadays widely prevalent 
throughout political elites. This is so partly because governing has become a very demand-
ing activity that requires a good level of mastery over complex issues, and partly because 
the proportion of people with higher educational credentials has dramatically increased 
over recent decades. Local mayoral offices would not be an exception in this respect. 
In the Spanish context, the outstanding growth of university educated citizens 
over the last thirty years has also extended to the social background of political elites. 
In 2010, 81 % of national MPs and 77 % of regional ones had university degrees (Ber-
múdez and Serrano, 2016). Regarding local government, the changes have been out-
standing. In the early 1980s Capo and associates reported —in their study about local 
elites in Catalonia— that only 11 % of all mayors had a university degree (Capo et al., 
1988). Thirty years later, this proportion had reached 70 % in municipalities over 
10 000 inhabitants (Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006).
As for backgrounds, there is a gap between the society as a whole and the political 
elite. Norris and Lovenduski (1995) identified an overrepresentation of what they 
called “talking and brokerage” professions. This category is comprised by lawyers, 
teachers, public sector professionals and managers, among others. The explanation for 
their overrepresentation in politics is that candidates coming from these professional 
activities would have many advantages of pursuing political careers, compared to 
other sectors of the population. In the first place, these professions involve the master-
ing of some skills of great importance for political activity, such as communication, 
bargaining and debating skills. The rationale behind this is that by performing these 
occupations one is better equipped to convince, explain and generate trust. Moreover, 
these professional careers couldbe more easily interrupted in order to pursue political 
office and without incurring too high costs. This is the case both because most of them 
are civil servants —for example teachers— who would keep their job positions guar-
anteed after coming back from political service, or because their colleagues can easily 
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take over their responsibilities in the organizations where they work —as it is the case 
of lawyers (Coller et al., 2008).
In studies of Spanish political elites, the largest group comes from the education 
sector (Coller et al., 2008). In 2010, they represented 23 % of all regional and national 
MPs, followed by lawyers (18 %) and professionals from the humanities and social 
sciences combined (22 %). Some differences by party affiliation were also observed. 
The conservative party Partido Popular was found to have higher rates of legal profes-
sionals on their rolls, while educators were more highly represented in leftist parties 
(Bermúdez and Serrano, 2016).
Other works specifically focusing on local political leaders in Europe have arrived 
at similar conclusions. In 2006, the largest share of all mayors in Europe —and among 
them 44 % of Spanish ones— were connected to brokerage professions (Steyvers, 
2006). For councilors, these talking and brokerage professions prior to entering the 
council are also the most numerous: 57 % in 2010, with civil servants and teachers as 
the largest groups (Reynaert, 2012). 
We expect our sample to be dominated by mayors with university degrees (consid-
ering the city threshold of 10 000 inhabitants), with the majority from talking and 
brokerage professions, with some differences in size and in party affiliation. 
Mayors’ career development: amateurs or professionals? 
The local political elite is characterized not only by a specific social background 
but also by increasing professionalization (Guérin and Kerrouche, 2008), particularly 
in the case of executives. This means that a career in politics has tended to replace a 
mayor’s initial occupation. Some changes in the governmental context have contrib-
uted to this outcome. 
The contexts of local democracies are not the same nowadays to those we knew of 
a few decades ago. Some specific external trends (urbanization, globalization, Europe-
anisation) and internal ones (rise of citizens’ demands) have introduced enormous pres-
sure on the exercise of government (Denters and Rose, 2005). Local institutions are 
being forced more than ever to improve their problem-solving capacity and effective 
leadership, in order to meet current demands. Consequently, political leadership now-
adays requires more expertise, an intense workload and technical understanding of the 
complex issues local governments are responsible for (Guérin and Kerrouche, 2008). 
All these circumstances favor professional political careers that are to some extent 
in tension with the traditional image of local politics as the last arena in which “ama-
teurs” exercise power on a voluntary basis, devoting their time to the public cause for 
a limited period of time (Aars et al., 2012). 
Previously, the ideal of lay representatives —as elected citizens empowered to act 
on behalf of their neighbors— was the benchmark: in this way, local democracies 
embodied the base of democratic government (Mouritzen and Svara, 2002). The 
Spanish town halls of the late 1980s, headed to a large extent by amateurs, illustrate 
30 Carmen Navarro y Alberto Sanz
Revista Española de Ciencia Política. Núm. 46. Marzo 2018, pp. 21-48
this reality (Capo et al., 1988). Today, this principle has receded and, instead, elected 
officials with more professional profiles, who conceive politics as a profession with 
specific patterns of conduct and routines, have gained ascendance. 
All this has not occurred without a debate and some controversy. However, what-
ever normative position one takes on the professionalization of the political elite, for 
the purposes of our study its salience lies in the effect it has on political recruitment. 
Not only have the criteria —by which candidates are recruited— transformed, rein-
forcing particular professional backgrounds (with no professional experience beyond 
politics or coming from communication and brokerage professions); but there has 
also been a change in the type of actors responsible for selecting them. As the exercise 
of politics has become more demanding, parties have occupied the local arena and are 
increasingly responsible for leading these processes (Reynaert, 2012). Candidates, for 
their part, increasingly tend to have party affiliations. 
On the other hand, and due to this stronger connection to parties, professionaliza-
tion allows for more scope in candidates’ trajectories. The party system offers an access 
channel from local to regional and central levels. This is even more accentuated in 
countries like Spain, where the electoral system of closed and blocked list gives parties 
greater control over the internal composition of the lists. After having been trained in 
the “nursery” of politics, acquiring skills and political experience, municipal represent-
atives would be more prepared to ascend to regional and/or national arenas. In the 
Spanish case, there are strong links between regional and national parliaments on 
the one hand, and local arenas on the other. In 2010, two thirds of regional and national 
MPs had previous experience in municipal activity either as councilors or as mayors 
(Liñeira and Muñoz, 2016). If the political career refers to the patterns of mobility 
once in office, local councils are, for many parliamentarians, the starting point. 
The trend towards professionalization can be empirically analyzed based on some 
indicators organized around two criteria: focus and scope. Focus relates to the exclu-
sivity of the job in terms of time and dedication, while scope refers to its duration and 
the prospects for the future (Guérin and Kerrouche, 2008). Prospects are closely con-
nected to political ambitions. Politicians could have discrete, static or progressive 
ambitions (Schlesinger, 1966). Discrete ambitions apply to cases when politicians are 
likely to step down from public service; static ambitions refer to those wanting to stay 
in the same office; while progressive ambitions entail the willingness to advance 
upward in the political career to upper legislatures.
For the amateur type of mayor, elected office would be an activity combined with 
another profession or, if it involves a full-time job, they would have less time to dedi-
cate in terms of weekly hours. They would be less likely to be members of political par-
ties and more likely to be elected from local lists, or act as independent candidates. In 
terms of political ambitions, amateurs are characterized by their limited ambitions: 
once their terms in office end, they frequently leave the work and do not run again in 
subsequent elections. 
Professionals would tend to be full-time mayors with long-established political 
experience either in the mayoral office or in the council. They are more likely to be 
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members of local branches of regional or national political parties, and their previous 
professional experience is frequently connected to the party organization. Where the 
political system allows it, they would tend to hold other mandates simultaneously in 
provincial, regional or national assemblies or institutions. In terms of political ambi-
tions, their intentions, once the current electoral period is over, would be to either run 
again at the next election for the same office (static ambitions) or to seek upward 
mobility to a higher political office (progressive ambitions). Given the described emer-
gence of professionalization patterns of local political elites in executive positions, we 
expect, for our sample, to find a predominance of the professional profile. 
Further, particularly for political ambitions, we expect to find variation among 
mayors in the preferences they express on this topic (discrete, static or progressive 
ambition), based on specific factors such as gender, age, education, profession, dedi-
cation to mayoral office and type of party. First, the literature has reported lower levels 
of political ambition among female political candidates compared to male ones (Law-
less and Fox, 2010), so we expect that this will be reflected in the mayors’ career pat-
terns. Second, the younger the person in the mayoral office the more actual prospects 
he or she will have for a progressive trajectory in politics. Consequently, younger may-
ors will tend to express more progressive ambitions. Third, education and previous 
profession may influence the motivation to pursue or not a political career. Less edu-
cated mayors will have fewer professional offers in the market once their terms in 
office are concluded and have more incentives to run again in the next electoral con-
test. Regarding professional background and unlike those who entered politics from 
the civil service, mayors who had a previous occupation in the private sector —with the 
exception of lawyers— are less dispensable. They do not have their return to work 
guaranteed if they extend their public service indefinitely, and, therefore, they would 
tend to express more limited ambitions. Finally, membership and seniority in a party 
would indicate mayors with a more politically professionalized profile, which will nat-
urally be associated with a desire to remain in politics. 
METHOD
In order to study Spanish mayors’ social profile and professionalization, this article 
relies on descriptive statistics and appropriate bivariate analyses. As for the study of 
Spanish mayors’ political ambitions , multivariate logistic regression will be employed. 
In this case, the main dependent variable consists in the mayors’political ambitions 
after their current mandate3. 
The independent variables considered in the analyses are: gender, age, education 
level, educational area, number of inhabitants of the municipality in 2014 (logged), 
3. The response options considered were: continue as mayor, stay in the local council but not as 
mayor, move to regional politics, move to national politics or return to a previous profession 
out of politics.
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party membership, type of mayor’s party (local, regional or state-wide), party family4, 
professional background previous to entrance in politics5, economic sector (private vs. 
public), previous experience in civil society associations, support from local media in 
early career, full time vs. part time dedication to mayor, weekly hours dedicated to 
their job as mayor, single mandate vs. dual mandate with responsibilities in other 
political arenas, years in the municipal council and the number of mandates as mayor. 
Depending on the metrics of the variables involved, the bivariate analyses consisted 
in crosstabs (with Chi2 tests), mean comparisons (with t or F tests) and Pearson corre-
lation’s (with t tests). In the case of the multivariate analyses of the political ambitions, 
given the qualitative nature of the dependent variable we employed logistic regression.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE SOCIAL BASE AND CAREER 
PATTERNS OF SPANISH MAYORS 
The social base of political recruitment
Building on the previous theoretical overview, we now turn to our data to see 
whether Spanish mayors in municipalities with populations above 10 000 inhabitants, 
follow the patterns identified in the literature on political recruitment of political 
elites and, particularly, local elites.
Regarding the socio-demographic profile of the Spanish mayors, our results tend 
to confirm previous findings on the topic with some singularities. In figure 2, we 
report mayors’ gender, age, level of education and area of university studies. In a nut-
shell, a clear majority are men (79 %), in their middle age (46 years old on average) 
and with a university degree (84 %) obtained mainly in the areas of social sciences 
(35 %) and humanities (23 %).
The gradual increase of women in Spanish legislatures experienced over the last two 
decades is also reflected in local institutions. This change was first promoted by some 
parties (particularly the Socialist Party) that applied internal quotas (Verge and Troupel, 
2011) for their candidates and later boosted by the Act for Effective Equality passed by 
the socialist government in 20076. Executives did not benefit from this increase as 
intensely as assemblies did. In Spanish local governments, the share of female mayors 
increased from 6.5 % in 1995 to 14.6 % twelve years later (three local elections) in 2007 
4. For the party family we followed the classification by Andersson et al. (2014). 
5. Following Norris and Lovenduski (1995) the professions were classified as: a) Executive, tea-
ching, business and legal professions; b) Technical, scientific, health and services professions 
and c) Without a previous profession.
6. The Act for Effective Equality (Ley Orgánica 3/2007, de 22 de marzo para la igualdad efectiva 
de mujeres y hombres) states that political parties should construct electoral lists in which the 
presence of candidates of the same sex cannot be below 40 percent or above 60 % within each 
section of five candidates.
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and to the current 19 % following the 2015 elections (Instituto de la Mujer, 2015). 
Municipalities above 10 000 inhabitants keep this proportion (as does our sample). 
Only one in five mayoral offices are occupied by women, confirming the stronger resist-
ance of the system to incorporate them into positions of effective power and influence.
Age is a feature in which Spanish mayors present singularities. Although our sam-
ple confirms the general pattern of political elites being middle-aged, they are none-
theless at the younger end of this particular period of life. As figure 2 illustrates, the 
mode is in the interval between 40 and 49 years. As an average, they are in their 
mid-forties (mean 46.3; std: 9), six years younger than their European counterparts 
Figure 2.
The sociodemographic profile of Spanish mayors. Bar graphs represent percentages
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. round.
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and the youngest in the European scene (mean 52.07; std. 9.15) (Steyvers and Medir, 
2018). Therefore, the data are in line with one of the traits identified in other studies 
about Spanish political elites: their youth. Compared to the situation one decade ago 
when the previous survey (POLLEADER I 2003-2004) was conducted, figures have 
not experienced major changes, neither for the total of European mayors nor for the 
Spanish ones (Steyvers and Reynaerts, 2006). No differences in age were found by 
gender either. Although female mayors are slightly younger than males (45.4 and 46.6 
respectively), the difference is not statistically significant. 
Regarding education, our data ratify one of the main expectations: the predominance 
of individuals with a university degree (figure 2). Mayors have mainly undertaken under-
graduate degrees in the social sciences (36 %) followed by humanities (23 %). Lawyers are 
only the third group (20 %), differing in this case from the standard law profile found in 
regional and national legislators (Coller et al., 2008; Bermúdez and Serrano, 2016).
In addition, and in line with the findings showed by other studies about local elites 
(Steyvers and Reynaert, 2006; Navarro and Medir, 2016), women are significantly 
better educated than men. 93 % of female mayors have a university degree compared 
to 81 in the case of their male counterparts. This indicates that education continues to 
be a vital resource for women (Paxton and Hughes, 2013) to try to overcome the 
structural disadvantages they face to make it to the top of the electoral list.
Regarding the expectation of differences in mayors’ social profile by population 
size, figure 3 presents the results. First, contrary to other studies that pointed to big 
cities being more diverse and, therefore, more open spaces for women to compete, our 
data do not confirm this direction. In this respect, the fact that the biggest cities in the 
country are nowadays governed by women (Manuela Carmena in Madrid and Ada 
Colau in Barcelona) can not be taken as a pattern. But, according to our data, big cit-
ies are not more hostile environments either. The number of inhabitants is unrelated 
to the likelihood of finding more individuals of a specific gender in the mayoral office. 
Second, the same disconnection applies for education. Although better trained may-
ors tend to lead larger communities, differences are not statistically significant. 
The component of the social background in which variation by size appears is age. 
The larger the municipality, the older the mayor tends to be (figure 3). This probably 
has to do with the fact that mayors in big cities tend to be very visible figures and rel-
evant actors in the party structure and in the multilevel political arena. As a conse-
quence, recruitment processes in these spaces will be more exclusive, requiring longer 
trajectories in politics and within the party to opt for the most important seat in the 
city hall. These differences indicate that municipalities surveyed in this study are of a 
different nature regarding size. Out of around Spanish 750 municipalities with more 
than 10 000 inhabitants, the highest proportion concentrates in the group of lower 
populations7. While mayoralties in smaller towns do not have substantial visibility on 
7. For Spain: below 10 000 inhabitants: 7359 municipalities; 10 000 to 20 000: 355; 20 000 to 
50 000: 257; 50 000 to 100 000: 83; +100 000: 63. INE 2015.
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the regional or national political scenes, those in big cities (especially those above 
100 000 inhabitants) are influential political figures with a corresponding singularity 
in their political recruitment processes. 
Differences by size are also noticeable in the vocational area of mayors’ university 
studies (figure 3). Backgrounds in law, medicine, natural science and mathematics are 
more likely to be found in larger cities, while a profile in humanities (geography, phi-
losophy and the like) is the standard for smaller towns. Particularly in the case of law 
—bigger cities— versus humanities —smaller towns— the differences are at the edge 
of statistical significance.
Finally, although party family —as suggested in the literature— stands as a dimen-
sion in which differences in mayors’ social profile can be observed (i.e. socialist parties 
tend to integrate more women among their ranks compared to conservative organiza-
tions; conservatives surpasses their counterparts in level of education), our data do not 
Figure 3.
Habitat size (logged), by gender, education, age and vocational area of the mayors. 
Whiskers represent 95 % confidence intervals for the means
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. Round.
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Figure 4.
Education, gender and area of studies of the mayors, by party families (Andersson 
et al. 2014). Bar graph represent percentage points within party families
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. round.
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confirm these expectations (figure 4). For our community of respondents, party ide-
ology is not a factor related either to gender or to educational achievement. Female 
mayors in our sample are slightly underrepresented in conservative parties, but differ-
ences are not statistically significant. The educational level (primary, secondary or 
higher education), for its part, is also unrelated to the party family local leaders belong 
to. However, in our sample, the vocational area of candidates’ university studies does 
vary by party affiliation, and differences are very close to the edge of statistical signifi-
cance (P.Val.:0.067). Specifically, within the group of conservative mayors, a univer-
sity degree in Law or in Medicine is more frequent than in mayors from other party 
families. And within the communist family, undergraduate degrees in humanities and 
natural sciences seem to be also more likely than in the rest. This result follows one of 
the patterns found in Spanish regional parliaments, where the conservative party dou-
bles the proportion of lawyers of the socialist party (Coller et al., 2008).
The professionalization of mayors
The data collected in our survey allow us to offer an assessment on the degree of 
professionalization of mayors, as well (figure 5). The standard profile in this dimen-
sion of analysis is a full-time mayor, member of a national or regional party, who has 
had a professional activity in a “talking and brokerage” profession and has a long tra-
jectory of having served in the municipality as political officer, 10 years in the council 
on average. Therefore, the patterns of professional politicians apply both to focus 
(exclusivity, dedication) and to scope (duration, political trajectory). 
Almost all mayors in our sample are in charge of the city government as a full-time 
activity with an extremely intensive dedication. Respondents report a dedication of 63 
hours per week on average, and some of them place this figure at much higher values, 
close to one hundred hours per week (see descriptive statistics in the appendix). The 
conclusion is that being a mayor is not like other jobs. Typically, their obligations are 
not limited to preparative work for a mayor’s duties or meetings with the council, the 
executive board or the administrative staff. It extends to ceremonial and representative 
functions, field visits in the city, interactions with other authorities, political party 
meetings, etc. Many mayors describe an activity level of 15 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
On the other hand, the “full-time trait” could easily be anticipated considering that 
the study only surveys municipalities above 10 000 inhabitants, with larger tasks and 
responsibilities compared to smaller units. Beyond the general pattern of profession-
alization of local executives, size continues being closely connected to dedication. Part 
time mayors are concentrated in smaller towns. 
What is an unequivocal signal of professionalisation is how spread party affiliation 
is among the components of this group and, more importantly, affiliation to state-
wide parties (figure 5). A great majority of them are party members (89 %). More spe-
cifically, 50 % belong to a state-wide party and 29 % to a regional party. Only 5 % of 
the total has run for office in local lists. In comparative terms, Spain ranks among the 
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first positions regarding the presence of national parties in local politics (Back et al., 
2006; Heinelt et al., 2018).
As the theory indicated, another feature that is usually connected to this pattern of 
recruitment is profession, the assumption being that professionalized politicians 
Figure 5.
Professionalization of mayors’ career. Bar graphs represent percentage points
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. round.
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would tend to either have no work experience before getting their first elected posi-
tion, or that they would come from “talking and brokerage” professional environ-
ments. The results of our survey’s support this expectation regarding the latter. Figure 
5 reflects how 67 % of mayors come from executive, business and legal professions 
combined with educators. Only one in four have worked in technical, science and the 
health sector or in other services. However, and interestingly, only a small percentage 
of them (12 %) declare to have no experience in any professional sector other than a 
function in a political party organization. 
Long experience in the local political life defines the career of mayors as well. Our 
respondents have been in the municipal council for 10 years on average at the time of 
the survey, mostly as councilors in the beginning, before ascending to the top position 
in the city government8. Only a small percentage of them are complete newcomers in 
municipal institutions. However, this proportion has increased in the last elections 
in 2015 due in part to the strength of new parties that have arrived in local politics for 
the first time and have obtained several mayoralties (electoral lists linked to Podemos; 
Ciudadanos). This recent electoral contest has resulted in a higher turnover in Spanish 
local governments compared to previous elections. The seniority of mayors has corre-
spondingly decreased and is now at 4.7 years. This means that, on average, mayors are 
in their second term as city leaders.
The circumstance of holding a dual mandate in an elected body (or as in the 
French expression cumul de mandat) is not extensively spread among Spanish mayors. 
Holding another position while they are in office is considered to be another trait of 
professionalization. It refers to the circumstance of being at the same time in a provin-
cial, regional or national legislature or in an executive body if the legal system allows 
(i.e. president of a provincial council). However, this trait seems to be more popular 
in other systems, like in France or in Ireland (Kjaer, 2006). For our respondents, only 
10 % of mayors are in this situation, combining the position of mayor mainly with a 
seat in the provincial council or executive body or in the regional parliament. 
In sum, Spanish mayors have a remarkable level of professionalization, especially 
regarding involvement with parties and seniority in local politics. But, what about their 
political future, are they thinking about a political professional trajectory that leads them 
to the upper levels of representative office, either in regional or national parliaments or 
executives? Or would they rather remain at the local level or quit politics? 
Mayors’ political ambitions 
Table 1 offers mayors’ answers to the question “for the time being, what are you 
planning to do at the end of the present mandate”9. 
8. In the Spanish local system the mayor is, at the same time, a councillor of the municipal assembly. 
9. We have aggregated the different answers in four categories: 1) I want to continue my political 
career as a mayor; 2) I want to continue my political career at the local level but not as mayor; 
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The answers are distributed as follows. Almost 60 % of Spanish mayors answering 
the questionnaire declare that they want to continue as mayor for another term. 
Nearly 30 % state that they want to quit politics and go back to their own profession; 
7 % prefer to stay in local politics but not as mayor; and only 6 % express preference 
for a change of political arena, continuing their political career at provincial, regional, 
national level or European level.
Table 1.
Political ambitions of Spanish mayors after their current mandate
Continue as mayor 59
Stay in local politics 7
Provincial-Regional-National politics 6
Back to own profession 28
Total 100
(n) 182
Source: POLLEADER 2nd round.
There are two categories with very small percentages, which reveal interesting 
logics in the mayors’ minds. First, stepping down from the first position in the city 
to a much less relevant job in the council is not a popular alternative. To understand 
this, we have to remember the characteristics of local government in Spain, where 
mayors are in full charge of all the executive functions and control the assembly 
whereas councils have a much weaker role. Considering councilors’ relative lack of 
political power and influence (Navarro, 2012) it is understandable that mayors do 
not see a reduction in rank as a foreseeable possibility. Second, although we know 
from other works that a relevant proportion of regional chambers’ members come 
from the local world either from councils or from mayoral offices (Liñeira and 
Muñoz, 2016), only a minority of respondents declare an ambition to pursue a 
political career, of which this is the first step in the trajectory. Here, there is proba-
bly a component of a socially desirable answer; mayors might interpret that declar-
ing ambitions could be seen as being uninterested in the job. Therefore, although 
progressive ambitions are probably in the minds of more than those who declared 
them, we cannot conclude from these answers that local political elites conceive 
their current position as the starting point of a political trajectory that will lead 
them to regional or national arenas.
3) I want to continue my political career at regional/provincial/national or European level; 4) I 
want to quit politics to go back to private profession.
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Given the small number of respondents declaring a preference for staying in local 
politics (not as mayor) or changing to another political arena (11 and 12 observations 
respectively) we will focus on the two main preferences that will constitute the two 
values of our dependent variable: continue as mayor or leave politics and go back to 
own profession.
In fact, what most mayors declare is the aim to remain as mayors. That is of out-
most importance for these individuals. We then have to understand that, in the local 
context, the political career does not necessarily involve progressive ambitions but, in 
terms of professionalization, it does indicate that these elected officers have tended to 
replace other forms of employment by political activities and that the likelihood 
to return to this employment is low (Guérin and Kerrouche, 2008). However, there 
are still more than one in four mayors who do not follow this pattern. Instead, they 
want to quit politics and go back to their profession. What factors can explain the 
contrasting political ambition of these individuals?
In order to answer this question, we have performed a logistic regression anal-
ysis including as independent variables the factors mentioned in the theoretical 
part of this article. Briefly we expected that: being a male, young, not having a pre-
vious profession or university studies and being enrolled in a political party would 
increase political ambitions and the patterns of professionalization of mayors. The 
results from table 2 confirm most of our expectations and, interestingly, run con-
trary to others.
Table 2.
Logistic regression of the political expectations after the mandate as mayor (Depend-
ent variable 0: Return to own profession, 1: Stay as mayor). S.E. in parenthesis
Female 2.109
***
(0.815)
Age -0.028(0.037)
University -2.558
**
(1.132)
Previous occupation in private sector -1.327
**
(0.642)
First/second elected in professional association -1.712
*
(1.022)
Years belonging to party 0.031(0.040)
Support from local media in early career 0.860
***
(0.322)
…/…
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…/…
Hours per week spent as mayor 0.076
***
(0.024)
Mayor in his/her first term 2.730
***
(0.739)
Mayors’ party type (ref.: state-wide party)
 Belongs to regional party -1.789
***
(0.682)
 Belongs to a local list -2.403
**
(1.200)
Inhabitants 2014 (logged) -0.019(0.398)
Constant -2.189(4.175)
Observations 112
Nagelkerke Ps.R2 .59
Log Likelihood -42.276
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. round.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
First, contrary to what was expected and all the literature reports, female mayors 
are more ambitious than their male counterparts. This finding indicates that, for 
women who have already broken through the glass ceiling, assumptions about their 
lower levels of ambition do not apply. In their trajectory to the top position on the 
electoral list and then in the higher office of local politics they have already overcome 
the structural obstacles and bias in the recruitment processes and so they are well 
equipped to pursue a political career once they are there. 
Second, regarding the other elements of the social profile, only education and pre-
vious profession (not age) explain differences. Not having university studies is con-
nected to the wish to remain in politics. This can be the effect of the marginal 
opportunities for these individuals to return to an employment comparable with the 
one they currently hold. On the other hand, mayors with a professional profile con-
nected to the private sector are more likely to want to quit politics than the rest. This 
is understandable as they are in politics at a higher cost, especially those with high pro-
fessional credentials shown by the fact that they have been active in professional asso-
ciations as well. They are significantly more prone to think about returning to their 
job when the current political term comes to its end. 
Third, mayors with more dedication to the job and belonging to wide-state parties 
are logically those more embedded in patterns of political professionalization and, 
therefore express more ambition to continue in politics. Probably, part of the hours 
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per week spent as mayors are devoted to the party and to political interactions other 
than those strictly linked to local policy issues. 
Two more factors have an effect in the prospects of mayors for the future. When 
mayors are in the first term of office they are more inclined to continue. And they also 
express a wish to repeat for a second period when they have the support of the local 
media. We interpret these results in the context of the high level of personal demands 
when one is involved in local politics and how it can have a fatigue effect as years pass 
or when other actors in local governance are too hostile. 
Finally, we observe that, in general, serving in larger municipalities seems not to 
be related to the political ambitions of the mayors.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has analyzed the social background and patterns of professionalization 
in the political recruitment of mayors, with own data coming from a questionnaire 
applied to a sample of 303 Spanish mayors in municipalities larger than 10 000 inhab-
itants. It has presented the main body of literature’s approaches and findings on the 
topic in order to look at the empirical data with appropriate conceptual lenses. 
Spanish mayors follow to a great extent the patterns of political elites and particu-
larly, those of local executives in other countries of Europe, but with some distinctive 
traits. In fact, like their European counterparts and the political elite in general, they 
are mainly male, middle-aged and highly educated. But, following a national pattern 
already identified in national elites, they are particularly young for European stand-
ards. The almost monopolistic presence of mayors belonging to political parties in the 
local arena stands as another sign of country specificity. This, together with the fact 
that a high proportion of them have been in local politics for relatively long periods of 
time and that they mostly wish to remain in politics (women in particular) place them 
in distinguishable patterns of political professionalization. 
This study has left some issues of political recruitment aside and has raised some 
questions as suggestions for a future research agenda. First, this article has not gone 
into the implications of the normative aspects that emerge from the results of our 
analysis. Relevant as they are, they deserve a separate contribution —probably with 
the support of qualitative techniques— which seeks to analyze the specific interactions 
of supply and demand factors in the political recruitment processes at the local level 
and identify where exactly the selection towards a specific profile occurs. Second, in 
analyzing political ambitions of mayors we were unable to trace political trajectories 
that start at the local level and continue to other arenas. We know that local govern-
ment is the nursery of many Spanish politicians, but this has not been revealed in our 
study. Again, additional studies that aim to reveal these processes would be worth-
while, not only to be able to connect the diverse political arenas of the multilevel 
Spanish governance but also to continue building with empirically develop our knowl-
edge and understanding of how local governments function.
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APPENDIX
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics
N Proportion Mean Standard  Deviation Min. Max.
Female 65 .21
Age 277 46.3 9.0 20 73
University studies 232 .84
Previous occupation in private sector 118 .43
First/secondly elected in professional 
association 23 .08
Years belonging to party 250 17.7 11.0 0 50
Support from local media in early career 264 1.6 1.0 0 4
Hours per week spent as mayor 270 63.4 15.8 12 105
Mayor in his/her first term 155 .51
Mayors’ party type
 National party 151 .60
 Regional party 87 .35
 Local list 12 .05
Inhabitants 2014 (logged) 303 10.2 0.9 9.2 13.4
Years served in municipal council 181 10.1 7.6 0 36
Years served as mayor 165 4.7 5.6 0 32
Source: POLLEADER, 2nd. round.
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